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Massachusetts

Gov. Herter Seen as Eisenhower's "Reasonable Political Facsimile" if President Fails to Run

CPYRGHT

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Massachusetts Republican scene so completely that there is little Republican discussion of other candidates in the event of the President's retirement. Both Nixon and Knowland have a following in the Bay State, but the favorite-son sentiment is too strong to admit of a competitive alternative.

If President Eisenhower decides to retire, the Herter Bandwagon will roll overnight. It will be a sleek, high-powered vehicle, specially geared for competitive conditions in the 1956 race for the Republican nomination. Yet Massachusetts' Governor Christian A. Herter is positively not a candidate so long as Eisenhower remains a possibility. In fact, the Governor believes that if the President's health permits, he will run and be re-elected; and Mr. Herter hopes to contribute to that result. The Governor frowns on efforts of well-wishers to make him a contingent candidate. Representative John W. Heselton, who headed Herter's gubernatorial drive in 1954, was promptly reproved when he attempted to initiate a direct mail campaign. State Chairman Elmer Nelson, another enthusiast, reluctantly accepted the Governor's ban on promotional activities.

But there is another side of the picture. Mr. Herter is in the strong, dignified position of not seeking anything (probably not even another term as Governor). He simply is conspicuously available as a reasonable political facsimile of President Dwight Eisenhower if a replacement is needed.

A "Natural" as Successor

The Governor will control the state delegation to the Republican National Convention. As his friends see it, Herter is a "natural" to succeed Ike. He is an internationalist. He takes the Liberal location of "the middle of the road." Eisenhower's friends are his friends: John Foster Dulles, Thomas E. Dewey, Herbert Brownell, Sherman Adams, Sinclair Weeks, Allan Dulles (who lives in Herter's Washington residence), Senator Salt- onstall, Joe Martin. As a member of Congress in 1951, Mr. Herter was one of the original Crusade-launchers who journeyed to Paris to convince

Eisenhower of his destiny. In recent months the Governor has filled many out-of-state speaking engagements and has been deluged with invitations from every part of the country. The Republican National Committee, acutely sensitive to White House preferences, has booked the Governor for a series of speaking dates in Florida and Michigan during February. Although Herter carefully refrains from "acting like a candidate," his speaking engagements and the quiet meetings with important Republicans serve to widen and deepen his acquaintance among professional politicians.

Standing an impressive six feet five, Governor Herter has both dignity and warmth. Few things are more ingratiating in a political personage than genuine candor, and the Governor has it in disarming quantity. With four children and twelve grandchildren, he meets the political specifications that give high rating to "a man of family."

At sixty, Governor Herter is in good health, although a victim of arthritis. He takes special exercises and his doctors declare that the malady has been fully arrested.

Because he was born in Paris, of American parents, Governor Herter's eligibility for the Presidency has been the subject of a mild legalistic controversy for months. There has been a great deal of speculation, and considerable research, but no authoritative answer. When the question came up in an interview, the Governor said, "I don't think anyone knows. It has never been tried in the courts. Some day it should be resolved, but, clearly, I'm a natural-born citizen." This seems to be the generally accepted view, but it may not suffice if the Governor should become an active Presidential aspirant. At any rate, his personal attorney, Frederick M. Dearborn, Jr., has been searching the law books.

Governor Herter dominates the

Unpledged Democrats

On the Democratic side there is no such unanimity, although Adlai Stevenson is the front-runner: for the first time in his political career Senator John F. Kennedy is actively engaging in party-organization activity. Kennedy will share with Representative John W. McCormack control over the Massachusetts delegation to the Democratic National Convention. The Senator is a strong Stevenson supporter and has been mentioned as a Vice-Presidential possibility on a Stevenson ticket. McCormack, however, is cool to Stevenson and may ultimately favor Kefauver or Harriman. The delegation will go to the Convention unpledged.

Governor Herter has succeeded in attaining stability in state government, despite a politically divided legislature (a Democratic House and a Republican Senate). He has been a popular administrator, notwithstanding some unfavorable local conditions. New business and industry, especially in the fields of electronics and plastics, have helped offset the disruption in the shoe and textile industries. The public outlook, generally optimistic, is significantly reflected in the widely prevalent opinion that President Eisenhower would carry Massachusetts again, if he ran, and that Governor Herter would do almost as well as a pinch hitter.

The Governor's popularity in Massachusetts may have created an unrealistic picture of his national strength. Should he inherit the apparatus which successfully nominated Ike, he will be a formidable contender from the standpoint of financial backing and strategic allies; but he would fall short of having a nationally representative nucleus of delegates to the Republican Convention. In a pre-convention fight, either Nixon or Knowland would find it easier to capture the conservative majority of the Republican Party

NATIONAL TRENDS

L. BRENT BOZELL

CPYRGHT

Since Mr. Dulles had *Life* snap a picture of him standing on the "brink," enough time has elapsed to say that the Secretary of State has accomplished at least one of his purposes in having himself caught in that particular pose. Mr. Dulles (or better, the Administration) had two objectives in authorizing the *Life* article—one of them strictly political, the other strategic. The political design was to head off the mounting Liberal assault against Mr. Dulles' person by launching a sweeping Republican counter-offensive. Dulles invoked "massive retaliation" against his political foes, and it looks as though his party may have achieved a major breakthrough.

During November and December, NATIONAL REVIEW took pains to point out that Mr. Dulles, incredibly, had been selected to bear the blame for the failure of the U.S. Geneva policy. According to Liberal commentators, Mr. Dulles' "clumsiness" and "blustering" rather than, say, Mr. Eisenhower's naïveté, had caused the rapid deterioration of our international position. A fight was developing that had Dulles on one side and Eisenhower over on the other. The Administration, wanting to stop it quickly, decided to start another—a fight that predictably, and more appropriately, would find Republicans on one side and Democrats over on the other. Moreover, the new fight—if it could be successfully picked—would be on an issue over which plenty of Democratic blood had been spilled in the past.

The *Life* article was about appeasement, and its explicit thesis was that Mr. Dulles (ergo, the Administration) is against it. Its implicit thesis, however, was that *only* Mr. Dulles (ergo, *only* the Administration) is against it—the not very subtle point of the second thesis being that Democrats are for appeasement. (The argument that such was the article's "message" hardly needs to be made; suffice it that *Life* represented Dulles' risk-taking as something new and different in American foreign policy, and that the available background for purposes of con-

trast is past Democratic policy.)

At any rate, Democrats clearly understood who the villain of the piece was—and reacted, as the Administration expected they would, violently. What Dulles & Co. did not anticipate, however (or if so, only in their most wildly optimistic dreams) was that Democrats would permit themselves to be mousetrapped into debating the wisdom of non-appeasement. Democrats had two logical counter-thrusts. They might have a) claimed that Dulles had hit below the bipartisan belt (perfectly true) and then turned him over to the Liberal authorities on that count; or b) contended that his policies have, in fact, not deviated substantially from the pattern established by his predecessors (also perfectly true). Democrats might have argued, cogently, that the theory of deterring aggression by war, or threat of war, was first proclaimed by Democrats. (It was Franklin Roosevelt's fundamental theme vis-à-vis Nazi Germany, as well as Harry Truman's rationale for the Truman Doctrine.) And they might have added that the practice of caving in under pressure had its most recent expressions in two of the three decisions of which Mr. Dulles is proudest—to conclude armistices in Korea and Indo-China.

Instead of doing battle on grounds where they stood a chance, Democrats chose to attack the theory of "deterrence through risk of war." This decision, as the tide of battle already indicates, was fatal. Democrats made capital in the press over Dulles' "war" language, but even that advantage cannot possibly be sustained: after all, the "grass-roots" know perfectly well that Mr. Dulles' daring gambles (or whatever they were) produced peace.

The main political consequence of the *Life* article is that it has set the stage for a new debate about appeasement. And the incredibly myopic Democratic reaction to Mr. Dulles' offensive may have already handed the election's foreign policy issue to the GOP.

Beyond its political design, the *Life* article's strategic purpose was to dis-

courage, or at least to postpone, a Communist attack on Quemoy and the Matsus. Dulles' message to Peiping was contained in the article's parenthetical comment that Mr. Dulles "never doubted" that Eisenhower meant to defend the offshore islands.

At the time the article was authorized, Dulles knew that the Geneva negotiations between U.S. and Red Chinese ambassadors had reached an impasse and would be broken off momentarily. Immediate reactivation of Communist plans to take the islands by force was therefore anticipated. Dulles wanted Peiping to believe that the U.S. might intervene; yet he was understandably unwilling to commit the Administration to a course of action that most likely will be rejected when the chips are down. Hence, the *Life* medium. Whether Dulles will successfully carry off his bluff, no one can tell.

The Hughes Case

Republicans do not intend to make political hay over the Hughes case. The saga of ADA-Democratic National Committee intrigue has, of course, a vast campaign potential; but so far, not a word has been heard from the GOP congressional campaign committees, or from Len Hall.

The only official GOP acknowledgment of the case appeared in the *Senate Republican Memo*, organ of the Senate GOP Policy Committee. And the background of the *Memo* story is revealing.

The staff director of the Policy Committee caught the sensational implications of Democratic skulduggery the moment the case broke, called them to the attention of two influential conservative members of the Committee, and suggested the case be put on the agenda for the Committee meeting the following day. The two Senators agreed. But no one at the meeting brought the matter up for discussion. Two days later, the *Memo* ran its unendorsed résumé of the case. Later, when asked why the GOP hierarchy declined to come out slugging, one of the Committee members answered: "Brownell." What Republicans fear, of course, is that if the full truth of the Hughes case were to become known, it would reveal substantial involvement of a Republican Attorney General in an ADA effort to discredit a Republican Senator.